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STANDING FOR THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY IN
EXTRADITION TREATIES: A MORE LIBERAL
EXPOSITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
James Mitchell is suddenly awakened in the middle of the
night by a pounding on the door of his London flat. When he
answers, he is met by two English detectives who inform him that
he is being arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the United
States government. Some time later he goes before an English
Magistrate, who, after careful scrutiny of the evidence against
him, determines that there is enough evidence to extradite the
defendant to the United States to stand trial for arson. Once in
the United States, Mitchell's court-appointed lawyer informs him
that because a woman died in the fire he allegedly set, the prose-
cutor is also charging him with felony murder. His lawyer as-
sures him however that the additional charge will almost
certainly be dismissed because the United States extradition
treaty with the United Kingdom specifically prohibits either na-
tion from charging an extradited defendant with a crime for
which he was not extradited. Unfortunately, Mitchell's attorney
never reaches the merits of whether the additional charge violates
the extradition treaty, for the court rules that the defendant does
not have standing to invoke the treaty provision.
Charging individuals with crimes for which they were not extradited
is a violation of the internationally accepted doctrine of specialty.' The
doctrine of specialty is based on the principle that "the State to which a
person has been extradited may not, without the consent of the requisi-
tioned State, try a person extradited save for the offence for which he was
extradited." 2 This rule was recognized as part of American jurispru-
dence by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Rauscher,3
and subsequently has been incorporated into almost all United States ex-
tradition treaties.4
Like the fictitious Mitchell, many defendants extradited to the
United States find themselves facing charges added on to, or used in lieu
1. 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 731 (2d ed. 1970).
2. Id.
3. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
4. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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of, the originally extraditable offense.' Though such conduct by the
United States government often violates the terms of an extradition
treaty,6 several circuits still refuse to acknowledge that an extradited in-
dividual has standing7 to protest the legality of facing these additional
charges.' These courts reason that the doctrine of specialty is "a privi-
lege of the asylum state, designed to protect its dignity and interests,
rather than a right accruing to the accused." 9
This Comment argues that such reasoning is erroneous. The pur-
pose of the specialty doctrine is to protect the interests and dignity not
only of the asylum state but also of the individual being extradited. 10
Thus, Article VI of the Constitution, which makes treaties the supreme
law of the land, explicitly gives the defendant standing by virtue of the
fact that a law of the United States which directly affects his or her per-
sonal rights has been violated.11 This position was adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Rauscher 12 when it recognized
the doctrine of specialty as a principle affecting individual rights.
13
Given this duality of purpose, extradited defendants should be able to
raise those rights given to them under American law even in the absence
of the asylum nation's protest. 4
5. See Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1989) (lengthening defendant's
parole requirements because of escape-though defendant extradited only for crime of fraud);
United States ex rel. Cabrera v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., 629 F. Supp. 699, 700
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (attempting to try defendant on charges in both New York and Florida-
though defendant extradited only to face charges in Florida).
6. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
7. "Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to
insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court." BLACK's LAW DICIONARY
1405 (6th ed. 1990).
8. See, eg., United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir.) (holding that only nations
signing treaty may raise its violation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895 (1989); DemJanjuk v. Petrov-
sky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "right to insist on application of the princi-
ple of specialty belongs to the requested state"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
9. Cabrera, 629 F. Supp. at 701.
10. See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text.
11. The United States Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
13. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 205-18 and accompanying text. The purpose of this Comment is not to
debate the merits of individual defendants' specialty claims. Rather, the issue presented in this
Comment is whether or not defendants have the right to have such claims heard by a United
States court. The distinction between whether a claim is meritorious and whether it should be
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II. BACKGROUND: THE DocTRiNE OF SPECIALTY
A. The Use of the Specialty Doctrine in Extradition
The United States' primary method of obtaining jurisdiction over a
defendant outside its territorial reach is through extradition."5 The
power to extradite fugitives to and from foreign states lies solely with the
federal government.16 By law the federal government may not extradite
an individualfrom the United States in the absence of a treaty, although
it may sometimes obtain jurisdiction over a defendant without formal
extradition proceedings in the asylum country. 7 Accordingly, the
United States government is currently a party to ninety-four bilateral ex-
tradition treaties.' 8 Pursuant to these treaties, hundreds of individuals
are extradited from foreign countries to the United States every year
on the basis of charges levied against them by the United States
government.' 9
heard is crucial. See Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1989) (granting de-
fendant standing to raise specialty violation although claim subsequently found meritless).
15. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public
Order, 36 TENN. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1968). Extradition is "the surrender by one nation to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands
the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
16. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 414; M. CHERF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADrriON
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 29-30 (1974).
17. Congress enacted legislation which mandates that extradition of fugitives from the
United States be done through a treaty, and subject to federal court jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-3195 (1988 & Supp. 1990). While the legislation does not preclude the United States
from seeking a defendant's return to this country even in the absence of a treaty (i.e., deporta-
tion by asylum nation), almost all American extradition treaties are bilateral. Id. § 3181 (list-
ing all extradition treaties to which United States currently is party).
18. Id.
19. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441,
1441 n.2 (1988) (noting that in 1983 alone United States government made over two hundred
extradition requests).
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1. Defining the doctrine
The doctrine of specialty has been incorporated into United States
municipal law2" in two ways.21 The most common is the doctrine's in-
clusion in extradition treaties, which, by virtue of the Constitution, are
deemed the equivalent of statutes.22 The doctrine has also been recog-
nized as part of United States foreign relations law,23 a body of municipal
law that has been devised by the legislature and the courts to help imple-
ment America's foreign obligations and duties.24 The specialty provi-
sions generally hold that the requesting state25 may not try an extradited
individual for any crime other than that for which he or she was extra-
dited.26 If, however, the extradited individual has been given the time
and opportunity to leave the requesting state and does not, the specialty
20. As used in this Comment, the term "municipal law" (also referred to as domestic law)
is meant to help distinguish the law of the United States from international law. See generally
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclu-
sion and Its Progeny, 100 H~av. L. REv. 853, 863-66 (1987) (clarifying distinctions between
international law and United States domestic law). In order to understand the distinction
between international law and United States domestic law a brief explanation about their rela-
tionship is necessary.
There are two schools of thought concerning the effect of international law on United
States domestic practices: "monism" and "dualism." Committee of United States Citizens
Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Monists believe that interna-
tional law is completely incorporated into domestic legal systems. Henkin, supra, at 864. The
judicial, legislative and executive branches of government under a monist system must give full
effect to the rules of international law, "anything in the domestic constitution or laws to the
contrary notwithstanding." Id.
Dualists view international law as a separate and distinct system. International law gov-
erns the conduct between nations, operating exclusively at the international level. Id. If a
nation's international obligations are related to considerations that are of a domestic nature,
effectively carrying out such obligations will sometimes contradict domestic law. Id, This
problem may be rectified by changes through domestic legislation, or by adopting international
law as part of the nation's domestic law and giving it full effect. Id. at 864-65.
While the United States legal system has some strains of monism, it is primarily a dualist
system. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 937.
21. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 478-79 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
22. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding that treaties are
equivalent to laws of United States and are given authoritative effect by courts).
23. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479.
24. Id. Foreign relations law of domestic origin is primarily comprised of federal common
law and statutes. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 cmt. b (1987) (describing function of United States foreign rela-
tions law) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
25. The term "requesting state" refers to the nation that requests another sovereign power
to seize and turn over an individual within its territorial jurisdiction. See generally 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 720-22 (explaining framework of extradition process).
26. 4 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-45 (1942).
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doctrine does not apply.2 7 Similarly, if the individual voluntarily returns
to the requesting state after the trial, he or she may face additional
charges for crimes he or she committed prior to the original trial.28 Fur-
thermore, the accused is liable for all crimes he or she commits in the
extraditing state subsequent to his or her extradition.29
The doctrine of specialty is one of many basic rights, limitations and
defenses of international law that are almost universally embodied in our
extradition treaties.30 For example, most United States extradition trea-
ties also contain such staple provisions as: (1) jurisdictional clauses;31
(2) double criminality clauses;" and (3) political crime clauses.33 While
inclusion of some of these provisions reflects "America['s] attitude to-
wards the concept of sovereignty,... others are designed to safeguard
the fugitive's individual rights."3 4
27. 4 id. at 42.
28. 4 id.
29. 4 id. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States char-
acterizes the specialty doctrine as follows:
Under most international agreements, state laws, and state practice:
(1) A person who has been extradited to another state will not, unless the requested
state consents:
(a) be tried by the requesting state for an offense other than one for which he
was extradited; or
(b) be given punishment more severe than was provided by the applicable law of
the requesting state at the time of the request for extradition;
(2) A person who has been extradited to another state for trial and has been acquit-
ted of the charges for which he was extradited must be given a reasonable opportu-
nity to depart from that state.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 477.
30. For a discussion of the almost universal application of these provisions, see Bassiouni,
supra note 15, at 7-19.
31. E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama, Pro-
viding for the Extradition of Criminals, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan., art. I, 34 Stat. 2851, 2851-52;
Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 7. Jurisdictional clauses usually hold that extraditable offenses
must have occurred in the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting state and that the offender
must be found within the territorial jurisdiction of the requested state. Id. For a discussion on
the ever-expanding definition of territorial jurisdiction, see id. at 7-10.
32. E.g., Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 19-21, 1922, U.S.-Venez., art. V, 43 Stat. 1698, 1703;
Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 12. Double criminality clauses provide that a fugitive will only be
extradited if the charges against the individual in the requesting country are also offenses in the
territory where he or she has asylum. See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523,
1529 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (rejecting defendant's argument that charge had no sufficient counter-
part in Columbian law).
33. E.g., Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua for the Extradition of
Criminals, Mar. 1, 1905, U.S.-Nicar., art. IV, 35 Stat. 1869, 1873-74; Bassiouni, supra note 15,
at 16. Political crime clauses prohibit the surrender of a fugitive to face charges that are of a
political character. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir.) (holding that pure
political offenses such as treason and espionage do not require extradition), cert denied, 479
U.S. 882 (1986).
34. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 7.
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2. The scope of the doctrine
Although the specialty doctrine appears to prohibit a court's subject
matter jurisdiction, it actually governs a tribunal's personal jurisdiction
over extradited defendants.35 The reason for this is that the requesting
state36 would not have the defendant in its custody except for the grace of
the asylum state.3 7 When the asylum state remands the fugitive to face
trial on certain charges it implicitly limits the foreign tribunal's jurisdic-
tion over that defendant to the charges specified.38 This in turn restricts
an American tribunal's ability to require the defendant's presence to face
additional charges.39
Thus, the maxim of American law that a defendant may not chal-
lenge the method used to secure his or her presence before a tribunal' is
not applicable when jurisdiction is obtained by the violation of an extra-
dition agreement.41 The United States Supreme Court made this distinc-
tion in Ker v. Illinois.2 In Ker the Court held that defendants extradited
by treaty "[come] to this country clothed with the protection which the
nature of such proceedings.., and the true construction of the treaty
[give them]."43 Noting that Ker was not brought to America by treaty
but rather was kidnapped by a private party, the Court distinguished the
case at hand by stating: "But it is quite a different case when the plaintiff
35. United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1986) ("The specialty rule
may initially appear to limit the courts' subject matter jurisdiction, because it bars trial of an
extradited defendant on some charges but not on others. But the extradition process is one
whereby a court gains personal jurisdiction over a defendant."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067
(1987).
36. The asylum state (also referred to as the extraditing or requested state) is the nation
that seizes an individual within its territorial jurisdiction for the purposes of turning him or her
over to another nation to answer for crimes committed in that nation. See generally 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 720-22 (explaining framework of extradition process).
37. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 15.
38. Id
39. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886).
40. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984) (holding that defendant's per-
son in criminal cases may never be suppressed); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474
(1980) (stating that despite illegal detention, defendant's presence before court is not suppress-
ible); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1952) (holding that defendant who was knocked
unconscious in Michigan and transported to Illinois must still face charges); Ker, 119 U.S. at
443 (holding that defendant kidnapped from foreign country to stand trial in United States
must still face charges). See also Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 12, in which the author, in
reference to American law, states: "[Tihe courts have tacitly accepted for purposes ofjurisdic-
tion such practices as disguised extradition, abduction and kidnapping, fraud, and false pre-
tenses; all have passed the legal test." Id.
41. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442.
42. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker involved a defendant who protested that his presence before
an American court was the result of being illegally abducted from Peru. Id. at 438.
43. Id. at 443.
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in error comes to this country in the manner in which he was brought
here, clothed with no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could
have given him... ."I
In order to more fully understand the application of the doctrine in
this country, it is necessary to discuss the doctrine's origin in the interna-
tional community and its adoption in the United States.
B. Origin of the Specialty Doctrine
1. The origin of the doctrine in the international community
The practice of extraditing fugitives was rarely followed until recent
times. In fact, "until well into the nineteenth century the surrender of
fugitives was the exception rather than the rule, and a matter of grace
rather than of obligation."4 Gradually the need for international coop-
eration in capturing fugitives was realized" and extradition treaties be-
tween nations became more prevalent.47 With the advent of modern
extradition treaties arose the problem of nations trying extradited indi-
viduals for offenses other than those for which they were extradited.4
Eventually the recognition that such breaches by the requesting state vio-
lated the interests and dignity of the aslyum state and thus implicitly the
personal rights of the defendant caused scholars and statesmen to en-
dorse the doctrine of specialty as a means of eliminating such abuses.4 9
44. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that the abduction was done both without the
authority of the United States government and outside the extradition treaty between the two
countries. Id. at 442-43.
45. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 720. Although the doctrine of specialty has been rec-
ognized both in the United States and the international community for many years, the doc-
trine's significance has increased tremendously in recent years. This is due to the ever-
increasing technical advances of modem society. With modes of transportation available to
suspects that can enable them to flee the jurisdiction of a country in hours (in some instances
even minutes), the possibility of fugitive flight is greater then ever. See 2 id. at 721. Professor
O'Connell notes: "[R]eticence in the matter of surrender of criminals was due, no doubt, to
the infrequency with which they were able to escape beyond the jurisdiction, but [modem
transportation] altered the situation in a dramatic way and stimulated bilateral agreement." 2
id.
46. 2 id. The author states:
The law of extradition. . . is founded upon the broad principle that it is to the
interest of civilized communities that crimes, acknowledged to be such, should not go
unpunished, and it is part of the community of nations that one state should afford to
another every assistance towards bringing persons guilty of such crimes to justice.
2 id. (quoting In re Arton, 1 Q.B. 108, 111 (1896)).
47. 2 id.
48. See, ag., United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 15,573);
United States v. Caldwell, 25 F. Cas. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 14,707); Adriance v. Lagrave,
59 N.Y. 110 (1874).
49. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410-12 (1886) (outlining acceptance of
specialty doctrine by world community).
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Although the need for the doctrine was well recognized, the enforcement
of the doctrine was a point of contention among scholars.50 The question
was whether "violations of international law have domestic legal conse-
quences."51 The answer to that question often depends on the approach
each nation takes to how international law regulates a state's status,
rights and obligations among other states.52 In United States v. Rau-
scher53 the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of specialty by
implying it "from the manifest scope and object of the [extradition]
treaty."
54
2. Adoption of the doctrine in the United States:
United States v. Rauscher
United States v. Rauscher 5 involved an individual extradited from
Britain for murder under the 1842 extradition treaty.56 The defendant,
who was second mate on a high seas ship,57 was indicted by a grand jury
for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on a crew member.5 The
defendant protested being charged with the crime of cruel and unusual
punishment when he was extradited for murder. 9
The Supreme Court noted that the treaty contained no specific pro-
vision forbidding an extradited individual from being charged with
crimes other than those for which he or she was extradited.' However,
50. Several late nineteenth century legal scholars argued that charging such additional
offenses was a violation of international law. See generally William B. Lawrence, The Extradi-
tion Treaty, 14 ALB. L.J. 85 (1876) (examining debate over status of specialty doctrine under
American law).
51. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
52. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964) (noting that while
international law traditionally involves state-to-state diplomacy, United States has also incor-
porated it into its domestic law).
53. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
54. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317 (1907).
55. 119 U.S. 407.
56. Id at 409.
57. The ship was American and thus within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. One possible reason the United States requested extradition of Rauscher for mur-
der instead of cruel and unusual punishment is that the latter was not one of the crimes requir-
ing extradition under the 1842 treaty. Thus, while the crime of murder may have been
sufficient to extradite the defendant, it might have been too difficult to prove, requiring the
charges to be reduced to cruel and unusual punishment. For a discussion of crimes extradita-
ble under the 1842 treaty, see id. at 411.
60. See id. at 410-11. Today almost all extradition treaties contain specialty provisions.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 311 (noting rules of extradition now almost all derive from
treaty sources).
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it ruled that the treaty's enumeration of specific extraditable offenses im-
plied that the requirement of specialty was to be met.61 The Court held:
[T]he weight of authority and of sound principle are in favor of
the proposition, that a person who has been brought within the
jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an ex-
tradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences de-
scribed in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is
charged in the proceedings for his extradition .... 62
The Rauscher decision also focused on the rights of individuals ex-
tradited under the treaty. 3 Its language implied that the right to spe-
cialty (as conceived from the treaty) was meant to inure to the benefit of
the defendant.' The Court noted that the judiciary was an appropriate
forum for an aggrieved individual to seek redress for violations of his or
her rights under the treaty. 5 The Court explained that, while in most
countries the only mode of enforcing extradition treaties is through the
executive branch of the government, in the United States treaties are the
supreme law of the land.66 Thus, the executive department need not in-
terfere with this nation's judiciary to ensure that the United States' obli-
gations to the extraditing state are met,67 for the defendant has the right
to invoke the treaty of his or her own volition.68
Although seemingly contradicted by Rauscher, some subsequent
court holdings have suggested that extradition treaties confer no rights
on individuals.69 Thus, the question of who may raise the violation still
remains: the defendant, the asylum state or both?
61. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
62. Id. Although in Rauscher the Court interpreted the doctrine of specialty as applying
only to the prosecution of those crimes not listed in the treaty, subsequent case law has ex-
tended the doctrine to prohibit any charge other than that for which extradition was granted.
Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 320 (1907); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
63. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
64. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430-31 (both Rauscher and Ker were decided on same day).
65. Id. at 430.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 430-31; see also Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475,
479 (2d Cir.) (noting that Supreme Court provided Rauscher with judicial remedy-prohibi-
tion of additional charges), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
69. For example, in Ex Pare Coy, 32 F. 911 (W.D. Tex. 1887), decided approximately one
year after Rauscher, a federal district court seemingly rejected the premise that an individual
may have rights under an extradition treaty. Id. at 917. For a discussion of more recent cases,
see infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
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C. Diverging Views on an Individual's Right to Invoke the Specialty
Doctrine in United States Courts
Although all federal courts recognize the doctrine of specialty as a
means of preventing additional and substitute charges,70 there is confu-
sion and disagreement among the courts over whether a defendant has
standing to raise such claims.7" The Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits
hold that an individual does not have standing to assert the doctrine be-
cause the obligation not to try the defendant is primarily meant to pro-
tect the asylum state's sovereignty.72 Conversely, Eighth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit opinions suggest that the individual has standing, sub-
ject only to the asylum country's express waiver of the right.73 Still other
judicial holdings, mostly district court opinions, appear to view the spe-
cialty provision as unilaterally conferring a right on the extradited
party.74 Given the confusing status of an individual's rights under the
specialty doctrine, it is little wonder that at least one circuit has called for
an en banc decision to resolve the issue.75
1. The individual's unilateral right to assert a specialty claim
Following the broad language of Rauscher, some district court opin-
ions have implied that individuals have standing to raise specialty claims
completely independent of the asylum state. 76 Such a view, when inter-
preted broadly, suggests that an individual should be able to invoke the
doctrine even when the asylum state expressly waives its rights under the
treaty.
77
70. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 407 (recognizing doctrine of specialty as part of American
law).
71. See Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 388 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).
72. See, eg., United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.) (only offended na-
tions may complain of treaty violation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895 (1989); Demjanjuk v. Pe-
trovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (application of specialty is solely right of asylum
state), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d
Cir. 1962) (same).
73. See, eg., United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir.) (defendant may raise
whatever objections asylum state may raise), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v.
Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d
1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
74. See, eg., United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987) (dicta) (specialty
provision in treaty is supreme law of United States, violation of which affects rights of defend-
ant), aff'd on other grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
75. Leighnor, 884 F.2d at 388 (calling for en banc decision to settle standing issue).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. 715, 718 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 803
F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
77. For example, in United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1009 (1986), the court rejected the defendant's argument that the specialty provision in
the treaty between the United States and Switzerland "binds the United States regardless of
1386 V/ol. 25:1377
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One of the most unequivocal assertions of such a right was articu-
lated by the District Court for the District of Columbia in United States
v. Sensi. 8 In Sensi the court took the position that the specialty doctrine
in the treaty was meant to directly confer rights upon the individual as
well as the government of the asylum state.79 Sensi was extradited by
treaty from Great Britain on charges of interstate transportation of sto-
len property. 0 The defendant objected to the indictment on the grounds
that the charges were not those for which the British magistrate had
agreed to extradite him." The United States government contended that
the defendant had no standing to raise the issue.8 2 The court rejected
this contention. 3 Although noting that the extradition treaty containing
the specialty provision is a contract between the governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom, the court recognized that "it is
also the supreme law of this land by virtue of the Constitution (Article
VI)."' 4 Thus, the violation of the treaty would not only breach the
agreement between the nations, but would also be "'a matter directly
involving [the defendant's] personal rights.' "s It concluded that be-
cause a law directly affecting the defendant had allegedly been violated
by the government, that individual should have the right to challenge the
government's action in court.8 6 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld Sensi's conviction.87
It refused, however, to go as far as the district court did in recognizing a
right conferred on the defendant, stating that the question of standing
need not be resolved since the defendant's "arguments [were] without
merit." 88
Similarly, in United States v. Vreeken 89 the District Court for the
District of Utah noted that, while as a general rule the defendant was
the consent of the Swiss authorities." Id. at 1422. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Najohn case.
78. 664 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1987).
79. Id. at 570.
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. at 569.
82. Id. at 570.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Ex Parte Hibbs, 26 F. 421, 431 (D. Or. 1886)).
86. Id. Although the defendant claimed that the charges in the indictment were not those
for which the English magistrate had agreed to extradite him, the court ultimately found that
the doctrine of specialty had not been breached. Id. at 569-70.
87. United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 892 n.1.
89. 603 F. Supp. 715 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1067 (1987). Vreeken initially fought extradition from Canada. However, realizing
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without recourse to challenge his or her presence before a United States
court, 90 he or she may make a challenge when such presence is secured
through a violation of an international treaty that confers rights on the
defendant.9 The court pointed to United States v. Rauscher for support,
noting that the Rauscher Court "specifically held that the rule of spe-
cialty is a right that may be enforced by the person who was
extradited.
92
2. The individual's right to assert a specialty claim subject only to an
express waiver by the asylum state
The Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that an individ-
ual has standing to invoke the specialty provision in an extradition treaty
subject only to an express waiver by the asylum state.9a These decisions
suggest that the compacting states' interest in incorporating the specialty
provision was not only out of concern for their territorial and procedural
sovereignty, but also out of concern for the extradited individual. The
specialty provision thus imposes on the extraditing state enforceable legal
duties that may be asserted by the individual. In essence, these decisions
seem to treat the extradited individual as a third-party beneficiary of the
specialty provision. 94 However, because the individual's rights are lim-
ited to and defined by the requesting state's international obligations to
the asylum state,9 5 a subsequent waiver by the asylum state extinguishes
any benefit that the individual may have derived from the specialty
provision.
96
that an extradition fight would be costly, he signed a waiver of extradition and voluntarily
returned to the United States. Id. at 716. Upon his return he was indicted on a second set of
charges for tax fraud. Id. at 717.
90. Id. The court ultimately held that the extradition treaty was inapplicable because
Vreeken was not extradited, but rather voluntarily returned to the United States. Id. at 719.
91. Id. at 717-18. The appellate court refused to address the standing issue, holding that
Vreeken "failed to raise the [specialty issue] in a timely manner." United States v. Vreeken,
803 F.2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
92. Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. at 718. The Vreeken court also cited with approval Rauscher's
construction of the American Extradition Act, now 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1988), noting that the
Supreme Court had concluded that the statute showed Congress's "construction of the pur-
pose and meaning of the rule of specialty, and that it conferred a right on those extradited
under such a provision." Id.; see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 433 (1886)
(Gray, J., concurring) ("political department... has clearly manifested its will, in the form of
an express law"). See infra note 197 for a more complete discussion of the statutory provision.
93. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 n.13 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
95. United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir.) (purpose behind letting defend-
ant raise specialty provision is to protect asylum state's interest), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921
(1989).
96. Id; see also infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Diwan 97 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
articulated this position. Diwan was arrested by British authorities and
held for extradition on mail fraud charges.98 Upon her formal extradi-
tion, the defendant sought to dismiss the conspiracy charges on the
grounds that the British magistrate had viewed them as non-extraditable
under British law.99 In response, the United States government pro-
duced written correspondence from the British government indicating
that it had no objections to the additional charges."°° The court held
that while a defendant has standing to protest additional charges in ab-
sence of comment from the asylum state, given the affirmative approval
by the British government, defendant's claim was meritless.'0 1 The court
stated:
In Rauscher, the precedent on which Diwan relies, the
Supreme Court fashioned a remedy for the accused threatened
with prosecution for offenses other than those for which extra-
dition had been granted. However, the objective of the rule is
to insure that the treaty is faithfully observed by the con-
tracting parties. The extradited individual, therefore, can raise
only those objections to the extradition process that the surren-
dering country might consider a breach of the extradition
treaty. Therein lies the demerit of Diwan's argument.102
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Najohn
reached a similar conclusion."0 3 In Najohn the defendant protested a
subsequent indictment in the District Court for the Northern District of
California for interstate transportation of stolen property. 104 Pursuant to
the original extradition request between Switzerland and the United
States, he was only to face charges in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania."' The court noted that the primary purpose of
the specialty doctrine is to satisfy obligations owed to the asylum state,
which relinquishes jurisdiction over the individual based on the promises
97. 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 720. Defendant was extradited pursuant to the treaty between the two countries.
See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
99. Diwan, 864 F.2d at 720.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 721. One of the factors that swayed the court was the affirmance of the addi-
tional charges by the British Home Secretary, who, under the British system of government, is
responsible for extradition matters. Id. at 721 & n.6.
102. Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
103. 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
104. Id. at 1421.
105. Id.
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made to it." 6 Thus, while the defendant could "raise whatever objec-
tions the rendering country might have," because Switzerland had agreed
to suspend the specialty provision in this instance, Najohn could not as-
sert these rights under the treaty.10 7
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also took this view in United
States v. Thirion.108 There the court held that the individual being extra-
dited is entitled to all defenses that the asylum country might raise as
long as that country does not consent to "extradite the defendant for
offenses other than those expressly enumerated in the treaty."'"1 9
3. The individual has no right to assert a specialty claim
Although clearly contradicted by Rauscher, some recent court hold-
ings have suggested that extradition treaties confer no rights on indivi-
duals. 110 Specifically, the Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have denied
standing to individuals, suggesting that the purpose of the doctrine is
solely to protect the asylum state's sovereignty."' Accordingly, there
can be no justiciable violation of the specialty provision unless the asy-
lum state affirmatively protests the additional charges.1 12 Such opinions
suggest that the defendant is at best an incidental beneficiary of the
106. Id. at 1422.
107. Id at 1422-23.
108. 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 151. Thirion involved a defendant who fled the United States just before being
indicted on conspiracy and mail fraud charges. Id. at 150. He was later apprehended in Mon-
aco. Id Monaco, pursuant to its extradition treaty with the United States, extradited the
defendant for all charges listed in the extradition request, save the conspiracy count. Id. Mon-
aco refused to extradite on the conspiracy count because the underlying wrong involved a
fraud against the United States that was not an extraditable offense under the treaty. Id. at
150 n.4; see also Extradition Treaty, Feb. 15, 1939, U.S.-Monaco, art. II, 54 Stat. 1780, 1781-
83 (listing extraditable offenses). Once in the United States, Thirion's request to dismiss the
conspiracy count was denied. Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151. On appeal, Thirion argued that the
specialty clause in the extradition treaty between the United States and Monaco forbade the
United States from charging him with conspiracy. Id.
110. Eg., United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
895 (1989); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962); see also Kester, supra
note 19, at 1465 (arguing some cases have "loose language suggesting that extradition treaties
grant rights only to the countries that adopt the treaties").
111. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 n.13 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (Ist Cir. 1981) (extradition treaties are solely for
benefit of compacting governments); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (specialty rights from treaty belong to asylum state); United States ex rel. Cabrera v.
Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., 629 F. Supp. 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant has no
standing to invoke either treaty or rule of specialty).
112. Cordero, 668 F.2d at 37-38.
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provision-no more entitled to invoke the doctrine than a completely
disinterested party." 3
A recent case that articulates this view is United States v. Molina-
Chacon.114 Molina-Chacon involved a defendant who was indicted in the
United States for trafficking in heroin."' Upon his arrest in Bermuda,
the defendant waived extradition and was returned to the United
States." 6 Once extradited, he protested that the superseding indictment
listed crimes that were different from and more severe than the indict-
ment in existence when he agreed to waive extradition." 7 The court held
that the doctrine of specialty had not been violated because the defendant
had waived extradition and he was subsequently deported."' However,
it noted in dicta that the defendant had "misconstrue[d] the purpose of
the doctrine.""' 9 A defendant being extradited has no right to challenge
the government's conduct under the treaty. 2 ' The doctrine exists as a
"privilege of the asylum state, not the individual right of one accused of a
crime.... If theie has been any violation of international law in this case
it is incumbent upon the offended country to raise it, not the defendant
herein."'' Molina-Chacon seemed to reinforce the Second Circuit's
view that the doctrine of specialty "is designed to protect the extraditing
government against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition."' 22
The ability to deny an individual access to the protection that an
extradition treaty might otherwise afford is a powerful weapon that the
United States government has used successfully in recent years. In
United States v. Kaufrman 23 the defendants claimed they were improp-
erly denied "the benefits of the rule of specialty contained in the treaty
between the United States and Mexico" by the appellate court hearing
113. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979). Therein the court
stated: "While conditions such as this [specialty provision in the treaty] provide an added
degree of protection for the extradited party, courts have been clear in their analysis that the
rule of specialty is not a right of the accused but is rather a privilege of the asylum state by
which its interests are protected." Id.
114. 627 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. DiTom-
maso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
115. Id. at 1255.
116. Id. at 1258.
117. Id. at 1263.
118. Id. at 1264.
119. Id.
120. Id. (dicta).
121. Id. (citations omitted) (dicta).
122. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
123. United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895
(1989).
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their appeal. 124 In deciding on the defendants' motion for a rehearing en
banc, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the State Depart-
ment's view that "only an offended nation can complain about the pur-
ported violation of an extradition treaty."""5 Finding that Mexico had
not protested, the court rejected the defendant's motion. 126 This view
was supported in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,127 wherein the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated: "The right to insist on application of the princi-
ple of specialty belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose
extradition is requested." '28
The judiciary's approach to individuals asserting standing claims is
fragmented and inconsistent. A final reconciliation of the conflict cannot
be attained until a consensus emerges among the courts as to whether or
not the specialty doctrine is intended to benefit the extradited individual.
III. ANALYSIS: STANDING TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALTY
A. Clarifying the Intent of Specialty Provisions in Treaties
As a general rule treaties are compacts between nations and thus do
not confer rights on persons.1 29 However, sometimes treaties contain
provisions granting benefits to individuals. 3 ' In the United States, all




127. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). Demjanjuk is distinct from most specialty cases in that
it involves a defendant being extraditedfrom the United States. Id. at 575. In such cases it is
difficult for the court to rule on the issue of specialty because its opinion would only be advi-
sory. The judiciary has no way of forcing the foreign government to adhere to the principles of
the specialty doctrine. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973). Nevertheless, the question of whether the specialty provision is intended to
accrue to the benefit of the extradited individual is the same in either situation.
128. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 584.
129. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1964). Therein the
Court states:
The traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive principles
for determining whether one country has wronged another. Because of its peculiar
nation-to-nation character the usual method for an individual to seek relief is to ex-
haust local remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own state to
persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international
tribunal.
Id.
130. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933) (vessel seizure allows owners to
invoke treaty rights).
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stitution. 131 Thus, an individual may invoke a treaty provision in United
States courts as long as two requirements are met. First, the treaty or
treaty provision must be self-executing 132 and second, the treaty provi-
sion must have been meant to confer enforceable rights on that
individual. 133
The United States legal system has recognized two types of treaties:
executory treaties 134 and self-executing treaties. 135 Executory treaties,
although signed by the President and ratified by the requisite two-thirds
of the Senate,136 require implementing legislation before they become
part of our municipal law.1 37 Self-executing treaties, which may be effec-
tuated without the need for domestic legislation, become part of Ameri-
can municipal law as soon as they are signed by the executive and ratified
by the Senate. 131 "Extradition treaties by their nature are deemed self-
executing and thus are enforceable without the aid of implementing
legislation." '139
131. The Constitution proclaims treaties to "be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CON ST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra note 11.
132. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). There the Court noted that "when such
rights [emanating from a treaty] are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute." Id. at
599 (emphasis added).
133. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
134. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 857 (1992).
135. Id.
136. The United States Constitution authorizes the chief executive "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties provided that two thirds of the Senators present
concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
137. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (noting some treaties require imple-
menting legislation before they become justiciable in United States courts); Caro-Quintero, 745
F. Supp. at 606 (noting certain treaties are not self-executing); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F.
Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding United Nations Charter is not self-executing). See
generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.7 (4th ed.
1991) (discussing treaty-making power).
138. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting some treaties do not re-
quire implementing legislation before they may become judicially cognizable); Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. at 606 (defining self-executing treaty). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 137, § 6.7 (discussing treaty-making power). The importance of whether a treaty is self-
executing or executory is regarded as crucial in determining whether a person may raise a
claim under it in United States courts. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606. See generally
Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, United Nations Resolution as Judicially Enforceable in
United States Domestic Courts, 42 A.L.R. FED. 577 (1979) (discussing rights of individuals
under United Nations treaties).
139. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607 (citing 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4.1, at 71-72 (2d ed. 1987)). For a
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Merely because an extradition treaty is self-executing does not mean
that an individual may invoke the specialty provision incorporated
therein."4 As noted above, the extradited individual must prove that the
treaty provision meant to confer a right on him or her in order to invoke
it.14 1 Thus, an individual will not have standing to assert a provision
under the treaty if the court believes that "the plaintiff's claim to relief
rests on the legal rights of third parties."' 42 This prohibition, known as
the "zone of interest test," is a prudential requirement for standing.143
1. The necessity of the extradited individual being an intended
beneficiary of the specialty provision
The zone of interest prudential standing requirement demands that
the interest sought to be protected be within the sphere of interests the
statute or law is designed to protect.'" As the Court held in Warth v.
Seldin :145 "Essentially, the standing question in such cases [claims under
discussion of the historical debate in the United States over whether extradition treaties were
self-executing, see BAssiouNI, supra note 16, at 30-31.
140. Whether or not a treaty is self-executing is closely related to, "but analytically dis-
tinct," from the question of standing. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
141. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1988). United States courts have been almost universal in their failure to articulate
precisely why defendants lack standing to assert a specialty claim. However, to the extent that
they focus on whether or not a right is conferred on the defendant, they are using the pruden-
tial standing requirement that individuals be within the protected class of the statute or rule
being asserted. See, eg., United States v. Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D. Utah 1984)
(noting that when defendant's specialty claim is based on treaty, it is necessary to examine
treaty to determine if right is conferred), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
142. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
143. All constitutional requirements for standing are clearly met in specialty cases. Article
III of the United States Constitution mandates that the individual show: (1) a "distinct and
palpable injury"; and (2) a "fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and
the challenged conduct." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,
471-72 (1982). The additional charges the defendant faces clearly constitute concrete and pal-
pable injuries. United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987) (extra charges are
violation of individuals' personal rights), aff'd on other grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir.
1989). A court may remedy the injury simply by disallowing the additional charges. See id.
144. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970). In Data
Processing the plaintiff asserted he had standing to contest a rule promulgated by the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Id. at 151. The ruling had enabled local banks and their customers to
use the data processing services of national banks. Id. at 152. The plaintiff, who also sold data
processing services, claimed that the Comptroller's action violated the statutory restrictions
imposed on national banks. Id. at 157 n.2. The majority found that the plaintiff had standing
because the statute restricting the activities of the national banks was intended to include the
plaintiff in its sphere of protectable interests. Id. at 157.
145. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth various parties petitioned the Court to redress injuries
allegedly suffered due to the restrictive zoning regulations of the city of Penfield, New York.
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statutes] is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which
the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the
plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." 1"
Diggs v. Shultz 147 represents the application of the test to treaty vio-
lations. In Diggs exiled citizens of Southern Rhodesia asked the court to
enjoin United States importation of strategic metal from that country,
though an act of Congress allowed importation. 4 Plaintiffs sought the
injunction on the grounds that importation was banned by a United Na-
tions Security Council agreement to which the United States was a
party.149 The appellate court dismissed the action on the ground that
Congress had the power to abridge treaty obligations by enactment of
domestic legislation.' 50 The court did, however, reject the lower court's
contention that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit."5 In focusing
on whether the plaintiffs were in the United Nations resolution's zone of
interest, the court stated that the resolution "was-and-is an attempt by
means of concerted international pressure to turn the Rhodesian Govern-
ment away from the course of action which has resulted in the adverse
circumstances experienced by appellants. They are unquestionably
within the reach of its purpose and among its intended beneficiaries."
'1 5 2
Id. at 493. Of particular importance was the Court's denial of standing to a group which
claimed that as a consequence of Penfield's zoning laws some of its members who resided in
the city were deprived of "the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated commu-
nity." Id. at 512. The group claimed that such a violation constituted a "palpable injury"
under the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Finding no intent under the Civil Rights Act to protect
the plaintiffs, the Court denied standing. Id. at 514.
146. Id. at 500.
147. 470 F.2d 461 (D.D.C. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
148. Id. at 463-64.
149. Id. at 463.
150. Id. at 465.
151. Id. at 464.
152. Id. But see Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua the plaintiffs
urged the court to grant injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the funding of the "Con-
tra" rebel force attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Id. at 932. The plain-
tiffs argued that the funding violated a United Nations treaty to which the United States was a
party. Id. (Article 94 of the United Nations Charter mandates that members of the United
Nations that undertake adjudication by the International Court comply with its decision. The
United States had earlier agreed to adjudicate its dispute with Nicaragua before the court, but
withdrew its claim on jurisdictional grounds.) The court in dictum noted that even if the
alleged treaty breach was justiciable in United States courts, the plaintiffs did not have stand-
ing to raise the issue. Id. at 937 (dicta). The "[tireaty clauses must confer such rights in order
for individuals to assert a claim 'arising under' them." Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.
1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). The court concluded that it was not the intent of the signatories
of the United Nations Charter to create a right for citizens of its members "to enforce an ICJ
[International Court of Justice] decision against their own government." Id. at 938.
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Thus, the answer to the threshold question of who is meant to bene-
fit from provisions in extradition treaties will depend on how the judici-
ary interprets the treaty. More specifically, the outcome will be
determined by whether it construes the language of the specialty provi-
sion as conferring a right on individuals. 1
3
2. Examining the language of specialty provisions to determine if
they confer a right on the extradited individual
Because an extradited individual's challenge to the court's personal
jurisdiction over him or her is based on the treaty's specialty provision, a
court is obligated to examine the provision's language to determine
whether it confers a right on the individual.154 Unfortunately, even a
cursory examination of America's bilateral extradition treaties will
quickly show that the specialty provisions are vague, contradictory and
often unvoiced as to whether they intend to confer a benefit on the extra-
dited individual.155 "[T]reaties are of little or no assistance to a court
attempting to determine whether specialty is a right of the accused or of
the surrendering state." 156
For example, several extradition treaties to which the United States
is a party contain language in their specialty provisions that strongly sug-
gests that the defendant is a prime beneficiary. 7 Such treaties give the
defendant the ability to waive the right not to face additional charges
even in the face of protest by the asylum state. An example of such a
provision is contained in the United States extradition treaty with Pan-
ama.1 58 The specialty provision in that treaty states:
No person surrendered by either of the high contracting parties
to the other shall, without his consent, freely granted and pub-
licly declared by him, be triable or tried or be punished for any
crime or offense committed prior to his extradition, other than
that for which he was delivered up, until he shall have had an
153. Jonathan George, Comment, Toward a More Principled Approach to the Principle of
Specialty, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 309, 309 (1979).
154. See United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir.) (responsibility for interpreta-
tion of treaties and enforcement of individual rights arising from them is with judiciary), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979).
155. George, supra note 153, at 311; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 565 (extradition
treaty provisions often purposely left vague and ambiguous).
156. George, supra note 153, at 311.
157. Id. at 311-12; see infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
158. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama, Providing
for the Extradition of Criminals, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan., art. VIII, 34 Stat. 2851, 2855.
1396 [Vol. 25:1377
STANDING FOR SPECIALTY
opportunity of returning to the country from which he was
surrendered.
1 59
Allowing the defendant the ability of waiver suggests that a right under
the treaty has been afforded to him or her."co If the principle of specialty
is only concerned with relations between states, then it makes no sense to
allow the defendant to waive a right that was never his or hers to in-
voke.16 1 As one commentator has noted: "Since it would be anomalous
for an individual to be able to deprive a nation of a sovereign right, it is
reasonable to assume that these treaties provide the accused some kind of
personal right under the principle of specialty which he may waive or
retain."
162
Conversely, when language in the specialty clause allows the asylum
state unilaterally to waive additional charges, some scholars have argued
that, at least implicitly, the provision holds that the defendant has no
rights under it. 63 An example of such a provision is contained in the
United States extradition treaty with Mexico.1 That provision states:
A person extradited under the present Treaty shall not be de-
tained, tried, or punished in the territory of the requesting
Party for an offense other than that for which extradition has
been granted nor be extradited by that Party to a third State
unless:
(c) The requested Party has given its consent to his deten-
tion, trial, punishment or extradition to a third State for an of-
fense other than that for which the extradition was granted. 
1 6
If additional charges violate the treaty provision and the asylum state is
allowed to waive such violations, it is difficult to ascertain what benefit
the original parties intended to confer on the defendant. 66
159. Id.
160. BAssiouNi, supra note 16, at 358.
161. See id.
162. George, supra note 153, at 312.
163. See 2 O'CoNNELL, supra note 1, at 732 (examining relevance of asylum country's right
of waiver).
164. Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. XVII, 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter
Treaty on Extradition-Mexico]; see also Treaty on Extradition, May 29, 1970, U.S.-Spain,
art. XIII, 22 U.S.T. 737, 744 (waiver is solely right of asylum state).
165. Treaty on Extradition-Mexico, supra note 164, art. VIII, 31 U.S.T. at 5071.
166. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 732. The author states:
If the basis of the rule is merely comity ... then, if municipal law is silent on the
matter, there would seem to be no reason why the consent of the extraditing State
should not overcome any difficulties. If, on the other hand, the rule of specialty is
one of international law, then... the accused would not be subject to the prosecution
whether the extraditing State consented or not.
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To further compound the problem of interpretation, many specialty
clauses are ambiguous as to their intent, 167 or suggest that their intention
is to confer benefits on both the individual and the asylum state. 16 8 Such
language only adds to the confusion the judiciary already faces in deter-
mining whether individuals have standing to assert specialty claims.
B. Interpreting the Underlying Intent of the Specialty Provision
Generally, when the terms of a treaty are ambiguous a court may
look beyond the face of the provision "to effect the apparent intentions of
the parties." '169 To do this, the court must examine the circumstances
surrounding the provision's incorporation into the treaty.1 70 This can be
done by ascertaining the reason behind the rule and investigating the cus-
toms commonly adhered to by the parties in regards to that subject mat-
ter.171 "When interpreted in the light of these circumstances, the sense
attached by the parties to the terms of a treaty, which otherwise seems
obscure and ambiguous, can be ascertained."172 Accordingly, the analy-
sis must be expanded to look at the purpose behind the specialty doctrine
and the reason for its incorporation into United States extradition
treaties. 173
Id.
167. BAsSIouNI, supra note 16, at 565; see, eg., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 19-21, 1922,
U.S.-Venez., art. XIV, 43 Stat. 1698, 1706 ("No person shall be tried for any crime or offense
other than that for which he was surrendered.").
168. See Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua for the Extradition of Criminals,
Mar. 1, 1905, U.S.-Nicar., art. III, 35 Stat. 1869, 1873. Article III states in pertinent part:
A person surrendered under this convention shall not be tried or punished in the
country to which his extradition has been granted, nor given up to a third power for
a crime or offense, not provided for by the present convention and committed previ-
ously to his extradition....
The consent of that Government shall likewise be required for the extradition of
the accused to a third country; nevertheless, such consent shall not be necessary
when the accused shall have asked of his own accord to be tried or to undergo his
punishment, or when he shall not have left within the space of time above specified
the territory of the country to which he has been surrendered.
Id.
169. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933).
170. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927) (purpose of treaty was to help
protect America against importation of liquor, thus treaty not meant to grant smugglers im-
munity from prosecution).
171. YI-TING CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS 74
(AMS ed., AMS Press 1968) (1933).
172. Id.
173. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); Factor, 290 U.S. at 293-94. This
can be done by construing the terms according to certain criteria such as the underlying intent
of the specialty doctrine and how it generally has been applied in this country. See generally
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRAC-
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1. The aslyum state's benefit
The explanation most often cited as the purpose behind the specialty
doctrine is that the requesting state owes a duty to the asylum state not
to try the defendant for any charges other than those listed in the extradi-
tion agreement. 74 This duty derives from several factors: (1) the asy-
lum state has no duty to extradite other than those duties that are self-
imposed (i.e., treaties, comity, etc.); (2) the asylum state's waiver of its
absolute right to grant asylum was done in consideration that procedures
outlined in the treaty would be followed; (3) prosecution of the accused
for charges not mentioned in the treaty would be a breach of the agree-
ment with the asylum state and a violation of international law. 7 ' Thus,
the asylum state, having acquired personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant by virtue of his or her presence in its territory, retains a special inter-
est in the individual even after extradition. 76 Acceptance of this
rationale, that specialty is meant solely to protect the extraditing state,
precludes extradited individuals from raising a violation of the doctrine
as they are not intended beneficiaries of the provision.'77
2. The individual's benefit
It is also argued that at least one fundamental reason for the rule's
existence lies in its concern for the individual. This concern may derive
from the fact that the individual is now an active and constructive mem-
ber of the asylum state's society,178 or it may reflect a concern for the
individual who, having sought refuge in the asylum state and the protec-
TicE, § 4.3, at 78-79 (2d ed. 1987) (listing several factors that courts consider in interpreting
treaties).
174. E.g., United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd
in part by United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
175. BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 352-53. Professor Bassiouni explains:
The rationale for the doctrine [of specialty] rests on ... (1) The requested state could
have refused extradition if it knew that the relator would be prosecuted or punished
for an offense other than the one for which it granted extradition. (2) The requesting
state did not have in personam jurisdiction over the relator, if not for the requested
state's surrender of that person. (3) The requesting state could not have prosecuted
the offender, other than in absentia, nor could it punish him or her without securing
that person's surrender from the requested state. (4) The requesting state would be
abusing a formal process to secure the surrender of the person it seeks by relying on
the requested state who will use its processes to effectuate the surrender. (5) The
requested state would be using its processes in reliance upon the representations
made by the requesting state.
Id.
176. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
177. BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 354.
178. See Sally Weinraub, Note, Double Criminality in Extradition Proceedings-Shapiro v.
Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973), 40 BROOK. L. REv. 1016, 1028-29 (1974) (sovereign
power of state is partly for purpose of protecting individuals in its jurisdiction).
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tion of its laws, is now being given up through its processes. 179 The in-
tent of the doctrine's incorporation into extradition treaties thus is not
only to protect the asylum state's sovereignty, but also to protect the
individual from indiscriminate prosecution at the hands of the requesting
state.
180
a. protection from indiscriminate prosecution
Extradition treaties are predominately entered into for two reasons:
(1) to expedite the orderly inter-nation transfer of fugitives;"' 1 and (2) to
protect each compacting nation's territorial and procedural sover-
eignty. 18 2 However, once the asylum nation agrees to surrender a fugi-
tive to the requesting nation pursuant to an extradition agreement, the
two nations have formed a contract of extradition with "respect to that
particular individual."18 3 At this point, certain safeguards and defenses
incorporated into the treaty come into effect.184 Some of these provisions
clearly are meant to protect the defendant's individual rights. 18 For ex-
ample, the primary purpose of the political offense provisions' inclusion
into extradition treaties is to protect the individual.1 8 6 The rationale is
that the political offender's actions affect the tranquility and security of
179. See BASSIOUNi, supra note 16, at 357 ("This restrictive view [sole benefit to the extra-
diting state] of the rule of specialty fails to take into account the relator as a participant in the
extradition process and his right to uphold such a doctrine when a demanding state acts at
variance with such obligations regardless of whether or not the surrendering state protests
such actions.").
180. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir.) ("The
'principle of specialty' reflects a fundamental concern of governments that persons who are
surrendered should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving govern-
ment."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
181. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, in 3 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROB. 272 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1950).
182. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Extra-
dition treaties provide a comprehensive means of regulating the methods by which one nation
may remove an individual from another nation.").
183. Id. at 1356 (citing government's argument). Logically, in those cases in which the
treaty has been circumvented, the individual should not have standing to invoke the treaty, for
the treaty gives no right to be extradited in accordance with its provisions. See United States
v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (extradition treaty does not create individual right to
be taken from asylum country only "in accordance with the provisions of the treaty"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986). However, in cases in which an extradition treaty has been cir-
cumvented by the United States government without the asylum country's consent, the asylum
nation may protest thus giving the individual derivative standing. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939
F.2d at 1355-56 (if nation from which individual has been kidnapped objects to violation of
extradition treaty, individual has standing to contest personal jurisdiction).
184. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
186. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
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the demanding government, making a fair adjudication of his or her
crime difficult."8 7 Consequently, the defendant always has standing to
raise this provision as a defense to his or her extradition." 8
Like the political offense exception, the doctrine of specialty is also
meant to protect the individual."8 9 It reflects a fundamental concern of
nations that individuals should not have to suffer the possibility of indis-
criminate prosecution once they are extradited.190 Indeed, if the spe-
cialty doctrine is not meant at least partly to confer a benefit on the
defendant, then it makes little sense to incorporate it into bilateral extra-
dition treaties. It would surely be more efficient, less cumbersome and
more expeditious to the world public order if the doctrine was not incor-
porated into treaties. If the additional charges were not ones for which
the asylum state would have set its processes in motion, then this is more
than compensated for by the fact that the requesting nation will recipro-
cate if and when the situation is reversed. Thus, the doctrine's incorpo-
ration makes little sense, unless, as one commentator has noted: "In
effect, the referred-to sovereignty of the asylum state is its power to pro-
tect the accused ... whom it has delivered up as an act of discretion,
[from] prosecution for crimes other than those for which the extradition
was granted."' 191
b. a liberal exposition of private rights is preferred
Over one hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court fo-
cused on the rights of the individual when it handed down the United
States v. Rauscher decision.192 Justice Miller, writing for the majority,
187. Id.
188. See id. (recognizing defendant's right to raise treaty's political offense exception). By
contrast the jurisdictional clauses found in extradition treaties seem clearly to be "predicated
upon the sovereignty of the state." Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 8. Consequently, an extradited
individual should have no right to invoke such a clause as a defense.
189. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
190. Id
191. Weinraub, supra note 178, at 1029.
192. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). Some courts have suggested that in Rauscher the defendant's
standing actually derived from a "prolonged controversy" over the issue between the United
States and Great Britain. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 615 (1927); United States v.
Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895 (1989); United
States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 608 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
Such an argument, while perhaps factually valid, fails to view the Rauscher decision as a
whole. First, the language of the decision clearly shows that the Court's intent was to recog-
nize the defendant's rights under the treaty. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the Rauscher Court clearly could have indicated that the defendant's rights were at
best derivative from the asylum nation's protest, but it did not. Furthermore, the Rauscher
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started his opinion by rhetorically asking whether "the prisoner, under
the extradition treaty with Great Britain ...acquire[s] a right to be
exempt from prosecution upon the charge set forth in the indictment,
without being first afforded an opportunity to return to Great Brit-
ain."193 After a brief examination of the American judiciary's previous
holdings concerning individuals invoking treaties, 194 the Court con-
cluded: "The treaty of 1842 [was] the supreme law of the land, which
the courts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any
appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that treaty
"195
The majority opinion intimated that such individual rights derived
from the asylum nation's natural concern about sending individuals who
had sought its protection away with no rights or recourse other than
those given at the whim of the extraditing state. 196 Thus, strict adher-
ence to the rules governing the extradition of the individual should be
followed. To do otherwise, the Court argued, would be "an implication
of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad faith to the
country which permitted his extradition."1 97
The Rauscher opinion is not an aberration; indeed, it is consistent
with how the doctrine has been customarily viewed in this country. For
example, our State Department had once unequivocally taken the posi-
tion that under United States law, extradition treaties also create rights
Court based its decision in part on previous state case law. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424-28. In at
least some of these cases there is no indication that a sovereign government in any way pro-
tested. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19 (citing with approval New York Supreme Court case
that held extradition treaty with France conferred rights on individuals).
193. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
194. Id. at 418-19 (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
195. Id. at 419.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 422. The Court interpreted the applicable extradition statute, now 18 U.S.C.
§ 3192 (1988), as expressing congressional intent to abide by the principle of specialty, and as
conferring a right "upon persons brought from a foreign country into this under such proceed-
ings." Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424. Section 3192 states in pertinent part:
Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign government to an agent of the
United States, for the purpose of being brought within the United States and tried for
any offense of which he is duly accused, the President shall have power to take all
necessary measures for the transportation and safekeeping of such accused person,
and for his security against lawless violence, until the final conclusion of his trial for
the offenses specified in the warrant of extradition ....
18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1988). Indeed, Justice Gray's concurrence in Rauscher seems to rest on the
existence of the extradition statute, which he believed endowed the defendant with a judicial
remedy for America's breach of the specialty doctrine. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433-34 (Gray, J.,
concurring); see also Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 478 n.5 (2d
Cir.) (discussing Justice Gray's concurrence in Rauscher), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
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for the individual.198 The executive branch stated that the belief that
extradition treaties "'create rights only between the Governments con-
cerned' ... certainly is not the law of the United States."' 99 Likewise,
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
recognizes a benefit conferred on the individual. It states that: "[B]oth
the person extradited and the extraditing state are beneficiaries of the
doctrine."'2 ' ° Furthermore, a review of the American judiciary's tradi-
tional approach to individual standing claims under other international
agreements suggests that a right should be found to accrue to individuals
invoking specialty provisions. 20 1 American courts have long advocated
liberal interpretation of treaty provisions when individual rights are in-
volved.2°2 As the Supreme Court noted in Shanks v. Dupont :203 "If the
treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other
liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why
should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?" 2°
3. The individual as an intended third-party beneficiary of the
specialty provision
An examination of the underlying purpose of the specialty doctrine
suggests there are two distinct rationales: (1) the doctrine is meant to
benefit extradited individuals; and (2) the doctrine protects the interests
of the asylum state.20 One possible way of reconciling these two seem-
198. Kester, supra note 19, at 1467 (citing 4 JOHN B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 601, at 321 (1906)).
199. Id. (quoting Secretary of State).
200. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 477 cmt. b. The Restatement goes on to comment:
"[W]hile the case law in the United States and elsewhere is not consistent, it appears that the
person extradited, has standing to raise the issue of variance between the extradition request
and the indictment by motion during or in advance of his trial." Id.
201. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (court allowed Japanese national to invoke
provision in treaty that allowed each nation's citizens to engage in free trade and to own real
property as defense to state prosecution of operating business without license); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (defendant able to invoke treaty ensuring aliens right to
leave country and return). See generally RESTATMENT, supra note 24, § 131 cmts. g, h
(1987) (discussing individual standing claims under international agreements).
202. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 131 cmts. g, h (1987).
203. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830).
204. Id. Some treaties have provisions specifically denying the rights of individuals to in-
voke their terms. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (mutual
assistance treaty specifically stated it extended no rights to individuals). Such a tactic could
have been readily available to the contracting parties of the various American extradition trea-
ties, if this indeed was their wish.
205. See supra notes 174-204 and accompanying text.
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ingly inapposite views is to analogize the specialty provision's incorpora-
tion into treaties to that of a third-party beneficiary contract.20 6
The comparison must begin with the premise that the extraditing
nation has incorporated into the treaty certain procedural safeguards
that intend to protect both the individual from indiscriminate prosecu-
tion at the hands of the requesting state, and the asylum state from pro-
cedural abuse.2" 7 The specialty provision's purpose is then, at least
partly, to confer a benefit on the third-party individual.208  The asylum
nation would thus take the position of the promisee, the extraditing state
that of the promisor, and the extradited individual that of the intended
third-party beneficiary.20 9
When the United States extradites an individual from another na-
tion pursuant to an extradition treaty, it is in fact utilizing a contract
previously made with that nation "to surrender fugitives to one another
under certain circumstances."21 0 This "contract" exists as a method by
which each state may determine whether it has been wronged under in-
ternational law.211 If the treaty incorporates a provision that is meant to
explicitly or implicitly enumerate rights protecting individuals being ex-
tradited, the extraditing state is bound to follow it, or be in breach.2 12 In
the United States, this contract with the foreign sovereign also becomes
part of the country's municipal law.213 As such, any violation of the
provision by the American government is also justiciable in the courts of
this country by the individual being extradited. 4
206. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (treaty's "meaning is to be ascer-
tained by the same rules of construction and course of reasoning which we apply to the inter-
pretation of private contracts" (quoting 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 174 (14th ed. 1901))).
207. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 477 cmt. b.
208. Under a general third-party beneficiary theory, a dual purpose for incorporating the
provision by the promisee will not prevent the third-party from asserting his or her rights.
Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 941 (11th Cir. 1983) (mixed motives of promisee will not
necessarily refute intent to benefit).
209. Contract law does not require the third-party beneficiary to be determined at the time
the promise is made; it is sufficient that the "identity can be determined at the time the promise
is to be performed." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 10.3, at 750 (2d ed. 1990).
210. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1009
(1986).
211. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964).
212. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C.) (dicta), rev'd on other
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
213. See supra note 11.
214. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). "A treaty is in its nature a contract
between two nations .... In the United States a different principle is established. Our consti-
tution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded ... as
equivalent to an act of the legislature ...." Id. at 314.
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This analogy would actually comport quite well with how the
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have been deciding the standing is-
sue in specialty cases. Their decisions have been premised on a belief
that "once there has been a formal extradition proceeding in the re-
quested state, that nation's agreement to extradite only on specific
charges must be construed as the equivalent of a formal objection to his
trial on the charges."21 Although these circuits allow a subsequent af-
firmative waiver of the specialty doctrine by the asylum state,216 this in
no way frustrates the analogy. The extradited individual's rights are lim-
ited to and defined by the requesting state's obligations to the asylum
state.217 Like a private party to a contract, a signatory to a treaty may
waive any obligations required of the other signatory.
218
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The doctrine of specialty should be found to exist as a right of both
the extraditing state and the individual undergoing extradition. When
the specialty doctrine is incorporated into United States extradition trea-
ties, the provision becomes part of our municipal law by virtue of the
Constitution.21 9 At that point it is enforceable by both the asylum state
and by the individual being extradited.220 The asylum state is a party to
the treaty as well as a beneficiary of its requirements. When a breach
215. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 n.13 (9th Cir. 1991).
216. Id
217. See Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). The Fiocconi case was unique in that it did not involve indivi-
duals extradited by treaty, but rather defendants who were given up as an act of comity (dis-
cretion) by the Italian government. Id. at 477. In Fiocconi, Judge Friendly noted that while a
primary purpose of the doctrine is to protect the accused from indiscriminate prosecution at
the hands of the requesting state, id at 481, "the underlying substantive wrong ... is only to
the [surrendering government]," id at 479 n.8. Accordingly, it became essential to determine
what the asylum nation would consider to be a breach of the United States' obligation under
international law not to try the defendants on additional charges. Id- at 480. By contrast,
when extradition takes place pursuant to a treaty, the formal extradition proceeding in the
asylum nation is considered specifically to prohibit the individual from being charged with any
crime other than those listed in the extradition order. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1355
n.13; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973);
see also Weinraub, supra note 178, at 1024 (noting Judge Friendly's holding in Shapiro limited
his Fiocconi decision).
218. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352. The third party is not hurt by the asylum state's
subsequent waiver because he or she would have been extradited regardless of whether the
treaty incorporated a specialty provision. Thus, he or she did not in fact rely on the provision
to his or her detriment. Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1122 (7th Cir. 1987) (parties may
change terms of contract until beneficiary adversely relies on agreement), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
960 (1988).
219. See supra note 11.
220. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
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occurs the sovereign may render an official protest with the executive
branch of the United States government, 221 or champion its case before
an international tribunal.222 The extradited individual, while not a party
to the compact, is an intended beneficiary of its specialty provision.223
The treaty's violation is not only a breach of the agreement between the
nations but also a matter directly involving the extradited individual's
personal rights. 224 The individual may thus challenge the government's
actions in court.
This view was originally adopted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Rauscher.225 However, the idea that the specialty doctrine has a
duality of purpose has never been uniformly accepted. 2 6 Several com-
mentators have suggested alleviating this problem by either rewriting
treaty provisions to specifically confer a benefit on the defendant,227 or in
the alternative, recognizing the individual's right to bring a claim under
international law.221 Such remedies are too cumbersome and compli-
cated to effectuate a solution to this problem any time soon.229 All that is
needed to properly effectuate the intent of the specialty doctrine is to
revise the applicable extradition statute. Congress should amend 18
U.S.C. § 3192230 so that it confers a right on individuals extradited pur-
suant to a treaty to be free from prosecution of crimes for which they
were not extradited. Specifically, the revised statute should include lan-
guage which unequivocally states that the right to be free from additional
charges inures not only to the asylum state but also to the individual
being extradited.231
221. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209
(1990).
222. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1964) (nation-to-
nation problems are often matter of international adjudication).
223. See United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd on other
grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
224. Id.
225. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
226. See supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
227. George, supra note 153, at 322-24.
228. See Weinraub, supra note.178, at 1029. See generally PETER P. REMEc, THE Posi-
TION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO GROTIUS AND VATrEL
(1960) (evaluating role of individual in international law).
229. That it would be time-consuming and cumbersome for the United States to renegotiate
all of its bilateral extradition treaties is self-evident. With regards to the international law
claim, in United States v. Rauscher, the Court indicated that the specialty doctrine was appli-
cable to the defendant even in the absence of a treaty. However, such a view has been emascu-
lated by subsequent opinions. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 355-57.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1988).




The judiciary's approach to extradited individuals asserting claims
against the United States government for violations of the doctrine of
specialty is fragmented and inconsistent. A final reconciliation of this
schism will not be attained until a consensus emerges among courts as to
whether the specialty doctrine is intended to benefit the extradited
individual.
This Comment has argued that the doctrine of specialty, as recog-
nized in the United States, does confer a benefit on the individual; its
purpose being twofold: to protect the defendant and to protect the
processes of the asylum state.232 Nevertheless, courts have continued
to either misapply or purposely circumvent the specialty doctrine.
Although the mechanisms already exist in this country to allow defend-
ants to raise specialty claims, 233 without proper judicial interpretation
they provide no useful purpose.
Finally, it is important to put this problem in context. Standing is
merely the ability to assert the claim.23 4 Simply because an individual
has the right to raise an alleged violation of an extradition treaty does not
mean that such a violation occurred. The defendant must always, how-
ever, have the ability to utilize every right given to him or her in order to
equitably adjudicate the charges against him or her.
Michael Bernard Bernacchi *
Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign government to an agent of the
United States, for the purpose of being brought within the United States and tried for
any offense of which he is duly accused, the President shall have power to take all
necessary measures for the transportation and safekeeping of such accused person,
and for his security against lawless violence, until the final conclusion of his trial for
the offenses specified in the warrant of extradition, and until his final discharge from
custody or imprisonment for or on account of such offenses, and for a reasonable
time thereafter, and may employ such portion of the land or naval forces of the
United States, or of the militia thereof, as may be necessary for the safe-keeping and
protection of the accused. If charges not in the warrant of extradition are filed against
such person, the person or the country which extradited the person (pursuant to a
treaty) may immediately petition the court for a writ of mandate to adjudicate the
legality of the charges against him.
See id. (proposed changes in italics).
232. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 n.8 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); RE SATEMENT, supra note 24, § 477 cmt. b.
233. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 7.
* This Comment is dedicated to my parents, whose love and support made completion
of this undertaking possible.
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